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1. Introduction 
This is an account of competing visions or designs of trans-Pacific economic 
cooperation, and a口empts to uni秒， or retain, the differences that have evolved, 
in the structure and objectives of the multilateral Asia - Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum. The means and goals of regulating and 
advancing trans-Pacific economic cooperation is important for us to care 
about because, if nothing else, the volume and value of commerce and 
investment across this macro-region is about that of a11 others in the wor1d 
combined. 
Since APEC was formed in 1989 with twelve founding countries gathering for 
its first meeting of foreign ministers on economic matters,l eighteen years 
have passed, which should provide enough time to evaluate its merits, 
limitations and prospects. Unfortunately, while a child bom eighteen years 
ago can by now be considered an adult, if APEC were human, this body of 
presently twenty-one members seems to be still crawling all over the floor. 
Countries coming together to craft a trans-national forum implies a joint 
search for some common purpose. However, so doing also means that the 
medium would reflect the con f1uence or divergence of the national interests 
and underlying values of the constituent members, particularly that of the 
larger economies, as defined by their goveming elites. As the mode of 
operation of any organization is important in setting its priorities or 
channeling its purposes, the tussle or harmonization of values and underlying 
interests among members has surfaced in designing or envisioning alternative 
futures for APEC. 
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I The twelve founding members that formed APEC on 6-7 November 1989 were Australia, 
Brunei Darussalam, Canada, lndonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and the United States. Economies that subsequently joined the forum were 
the People 's Republic of China, Hong Kong and Chinese Taipei (Taiwan) on 12-14 November 
1991 , Mexico and Papua New Guinea on 17-19 November 1993 , Chile on 11-12 November 1994, 
and Peru, Russia and Vietnam on 14-15 November 1998 
For the United States, APEC's utility depended on its ability to accelerate the 
process of trade liberalization within the grouping, particularly in improving 
US access to East Asian markets in areas where the US is competitive, such as 
aircra缸， telecommunications and banking and insurance, and to strengthen 
America's hands in trade negotiations with the European Union. A major 
consideration of both Japan and Australia in helping to bring about APEC was 
their attempt to thwart protectionist impulses on the part of the Europeans and 
Americans, through directing the development of an open or 
non-discriminatory trans-Pacific trade liberalizing economic arrangement. 
With the acquiescence of the US, Japan had also hoped APEC would play to 
its strength as a major economic power and provide a stage for it to claim a 
leadership role in the Asian half of the forum through its trade with, 
investment in, technological transfers to, and financial institutions operating 
in other Asian countries. 
China's vision for APEC was that of a consultative forum where decisions 
should be made gradually and through consensus, and economic and technical 
cooperation should be carried out on an equal footing with the reduction of 
trade barriers (Camilleri 2003, 161). In particular, China had hoped that 
APEC could assuage US unilateralism in trade relations, enhance its prospects 
of gaining admission into the World Trade Organization (WTO), and 
legitimize its expanding influence in the Asia-Pacific region (Camilleri 2003 , 
161). As for the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), while fully cognizant of APEC's usefulness in keeping the US 
market open in the face of increasing American protectionist sentiments, they 
were worried that joining APEC would mean diluting the salient position of 
ASEAN as a bloc in managing Southeast Asian affairs for themselves. As 
such, at a ministerial conference at Kuching, Malaysia, in 1990, the ASEAN 
countries came to a consensus that participation in APEC must not come at 
the expense of ASEAN unity and cohesion, that APEC should not evolve 
from a forum for discussion into an arena for economic bargaining or 
negotiation, and that APEC should not be transformed into a formal , 
structured institution (Lu 1997a, 103). 
As APEC evolved, an “evolutionary approach" generally favored by the Asian, 
Chinese and developing member govemments or economies loosely 
organized around a forum where commitments are voluntary with emphasis 
on arriving at consensus unhurriedly through personal diplomacy and 
informal discussions has come to dominate the modus operandi of the forum; 
this has often been contrasted with a “ legalistic and institutional approach" 
championed by the United States, and supported by Canada, Australia and 
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New Zealand, which was to focus on building APEC up as a formal and 
structured organization where theprimary function of structured negotiations 
is to produce binding contracts and agreements (Camilleri 2003 , 144; Liu 
1997, 81). 1n the former case, the appeal and stress is on the contribution to 
national development and domestic security through technical and economic 
cooperation - the subsumption of markets to the political logic of security and 
order (Beeson and Jayasuriya 1998, 316), while in the latter case, the 
construction of a trans-Pacific market is conceived primarily in terms of 
maximizing individual choice by locking in the liberalization of trade and 
associated economic processes through binding, comprehensive targets. 
Although there is basic agreement among APEC member economies on the 
principles of economic cooperation and trade and investment liberalization, 
when concrete issues arise which involve national interest, consensus on any 
matter is typically hard to achieve, and the differences in approach adopted by 
countries favoring either one of the two m司or styles of economic regionalism 
are revealed. This division in the fundamental outlook for the forum has led to 
differences over how best to reach APEC's goals of trade liberalization, the 
extent to which APEC should be institutionalized, and the items to be put on 
the agenda of the annual meetings, differences that are at times so deep that 
the effective functioning of the forum itself gets questioned. As we shall see, 
these differences in approach, because they are bifurcated into, and supported 
by, two broad groups of countries on either side of the division, have the 
effect of moving the forum from one dominant design to another as member 
economies both create and respond to changing circumstances, with both 
designs overlapping during the shift as a result of compromises made. 
1I.0ne “Western / American / Structural" Design (1989-1993) 
Australia's Prime Minister Bob Hawke originally proposed a regional 
economic grouping to support trade liberalization and encourage coordination 
of economic policy with membership restricted to ASEAN, Australia, New 
Zealand, Japan and South Korea; however, Australia's suggestion to exclude 
the US and Canada caused misgivings from Japan, and 1ndonesia emphasized 
the role of the US in balancing Japanese economic dominance (Walsh 1993, 
548-9). After canvassing several East Asian govemments and the US , Hawke 
revised his proposal to include the US and Canada, recognizing them as major 
forces driving the Asia - Pacific economy (Walsh 1993, 549). 
The earliest “ Western / American / Structured" (shortened to “Westem") 
vision or design for APEC was what the US , major Westem countries like 
Australia, New Zealand and Canada, and Japan had in mind as far back as the 
occasion of its inaugural meeting, then only at the level of ministers 
concerned with foreign and economic matters, in Canberra, Australia, in 
November 1989. Such a design would have accorded well with the structured 
and bureaucratized representative democratic systems of governance that 
policy makers in these countries embrace. At the APEC ministerial meeting in 
Seoul, South Korea, in November 1991 , an APEC secretariat was proposed 
for establishment in Singapore the following year. At APEC's Fourth 
扎1inisterial 此1eeting in 1992 in Singapore, Japan and Thailand suggested 
bringing security issues into the forum (Liang and Wang 2000, 57), but when 
faced with less than enthusiastic response from other Asian countries, decided 
to drop the matter. The US was initially not too enthusiastic about APEC, and 
still trying to figure out its exact purpose, until an expert body of economic 
advisors, known as the Eminent Persons' Group, was constituted by the forum 
at its 1992 meeting, and soon took on the task of advocating across-the-board 
trade liberalization, which greatly raised Washington's interest in the 
groupmg. 
The high point of the “Western" design was reached at the first APEC 
Heads-of-State Meeting or Leaders' Summit at Blake Island off Seattle in the 
US in November 1993 , when the host, US President Bill Clinton, suggested 
renaming and structuralizing the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation as the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Community, along the lines of the European 
Economic Community, precursor of the European Union. In a talk at Japan's 
Waseda University earlier that July and on a subsequent visit to South Korea, 
President Clinton pointed out that US strategic policy in the Asia-Pacific 
region would henceforth be based on three elements: 1) Comprehensive US 
involvement in Asia-Pacific economic cooperation, 2) Realization of an 
Asia-Pacific multilateral security mechanism under US leadership, and 3) 
Promoting democratization in Asia-Pacific countries (Wang 2003，的7; Liang 
and Wang 2000, 57). The US President also had plans to combine the existing 
North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the putative Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA) with APEC into a gigantic Asia-Pacific Free Trade 
Area (APFTA) (Wei 1996, 55). The American vision for APEC was clearly 
not just for the forum to push for a structured Asia-Pacific-wide free trade 
area, but also for the body to turn into a multilateral security arrangement 
under the direction of the US , and realize its political objective of spreading 
pluralism. 
As primarily an economic forum, trade liberalization, in the “Western" vision, 
was to be APEC's principal objective，的 it was that of the US , which 
organized, led and dominated the Seattle Meeting. At least until 1995, the US 
economic policy stance on APEC could be summarized as follows 1) 
Transform APEC as soon as possible into an Asia-Pacific free trade area 
through negotiations and agreements, 2) Liberalize trade in all economic 
sectors to avoid delay and allowing member economies to make strategic 
choices of “ pick and choose," 3) Adopt the principle of discrimination 
between member and non-member economies to avoid non-member 
economies “ free riding" on APEC's trade liberalization efforts, and 4) Push 
for a structured forum with legally binding commitments through collective 
agreement (Liu 1997, 83; Wang 2003, 141). As outlined in 1992 by the 
Australian government, which has been a prime mover of APEC's early 
development, there were four steps for APEC to take to advance its trade 
liberalization objectives: reduce uncertainties in the regional market, address 
physical impediments to trade, harmonize national regulations and standards, 
and improve market access (Camilleri 2003 , 147-148). 
Free trade became, especially for the English-speaking industrialized 
economies, the dominant discourse of which they were more than prepared to 
push onto APEC's agenda to the extent of marginalizing any other views or 
interests. They saw traditional business practices elsewhere, particularly in the 
East and Southeast Asian countries, as manifesting widespread collusion, 
between firms , across industries, and among the political and economic elites, 
based on patronage and close personal ties, and these entrenched customs and 
domestic interest networks were what they wished to sweep away with the 
promotion and institutionalization of trade liberalization within APEC. 
Debates over free trade, and the attendant principle of discrimination, would 
become the major bones of contention between the US and industrialized 
Western economies on the one hand, and China and the developing Asian 
economies on the other, and subsequently the rock on which the utility of 
APEC as a meaningful economic grouping would crash. 
China was obviously too large an Asian-Pacific economy to be left out of the 
forum, but its membership has proven to be problematic right from the 
beginning. The US has argued that, since China was not a market economy, it 
should not be allowed to join APEC. However, since the People's Republic of 
China cIaims Taiwan as part of its territory and was about to “resume" 
sovereignty over Hong Kong from Britain, diplomatic realities dictated that 
the exclusion of China would also mean the excIusion of the vibrant market 
economies of Hong Kong and Taiwan. This quandary was resolved when，的
the 1991 Seoul ministerial meeting approached, Taiwan agreed to attend 
APEC meetings as “Chinese Taipei", together with China and Hong Kong, 
(Walsh 1993, 551 , 554). China accepted this arrangement reluctantly，的 long
as all APEC members were designated as “economies" and not “states," 
which reflected its diplomatic weakness and isolation in the wake of the June 
1989 Tiananmen Incident and its concern not to be left out of an emerging 
inter-govemmental regional economic process, particularly since about 75% 
of China's trade and 800/0 of its foreign capital in the early 1990s involved 
other APEC members (Morrison 2002, 127-128). However, although other 
APEC governments have agreed that China would have an effective veto over 
who would represent Taiwan at the leaders' and other meetings, Beijing 
would never again consent to Taipei taking part in any multilateral or regional 
design in which government officials are the participants. 
The major institutional advancements for APEC took place between the 1992 
ministerial meeting in Singapore and 1994 leaders' meeting in Bogor, 
Indonesia. A small secretariat with a very limited budget, autonomy and 
research capability was established at the Singapore meeting to facilitate and 
coordinate APEC activities. The APEC Secretariat is led by an Executive 
Director seconded from the member economy which is the annual host of the 
APEC process, and usual1y aided by one official each seconded from the 
foreign affairs or trade ministries of member economies for two to three years, 
and a proximate number of locally recruited administrative support staff 
(Goodings 2003 , 68). Aside from the Secretariat, an Eminent Persons ' Group 
(EPG) was also established at the 1992 meeting, the majority of whose 
members were economists under the chairmanship of American economist C. 
Fred Bergsten, and saw the task of the EPG as devising a roadmap for APEC 
to set itself on the path of trade, investment and later even financial 
liberalization. 
It was at the Seattle Leaders' Meeting in 1993 that arrangements were made 
for the two arguably most important APEC standing policy committees, the 
Committee on Trade and Investment (CTI) and the Budget and Management 
Committee (BMC) to be established in 1994 and meet twice a year. The 
Economic Committee, established at the 4th APEC Ministerial Meeting in 
1994, has a mandate to promote structural, regulatory and legal reform in 
member economies, but this committee has been extremely hesitant, and one 
may even say, almost powerless, to drive any changes within the forum , 
except by organizing seminars and workshops on strengthening economic and 
legal infrastructure (http://www.apec.org/contentlapec/apec_groups/ 
committees/economic _ committee.html). By 1994, institutionally, there were 
in place five levels of organizational activities, from top to bottom: APEC 
Informal Leaders' Meeting, Ministerial Meeting, Sectoral Ministerial Meeting, 
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Senior Officers' Meeting (SOM), and committee or working group, plus the 
Secretariat. Typically, the APEC Informal Leaders' Meeting takes place at the 
second half of every year, coinciding with concurrent meetings of foreign 
ministers, ministers of economics and trade, and business leaders. These 
ministerial meetings, which approve the budget and set policy directions for 
the forum in the following year, build on the ministerial meetings of economic 
sectors held occasionally throughout the year, all of which are supported by 
the SOMs, which are held four times a year, and serve as a coordinating body 
for the committees and working groups (Bodde 1994, 67) 
111. Two Competing Designs: “Western / American / Structured" vs. 
“Asian / Chinese / Process-oriented" (1994-1995) 
As a regional trade grouping, APEC had a competitor almost right from its 
birth. Worries about emerging trade blocs and protectionism in Europe and 
North America led Malaysia in December 1990 to propose an East Asian 
Economic Group (EAEG) that excluded the US, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. US officials opposed the proposal, and under pressure from 
Washington, Tokyo was non-committal about the proposal (Walsh 1993, 555). 
As decided at the ASEAN finance ministers' meeting in October 1991 , EAEG 
was renamed EAEC, grouping the ASEAN states with China, Japan and 
South Korea into an “ East Asian Economic Caucus" and after consideration 
by the ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting in July 1993, despite US opposition, 
EAEC became a conclave under APEC to discuss issues of common concem 
to East Asian economies (Shi 1997, 11; Lu 1997 a, 104-105). Except for the 
open, industrialized and heavily export-oriented economies of Hong Kong 
and Singapore, which are unsurprisingly ardent free-trade advocates, the 
EAEC would become, for the “Western" design, a viper in APEC's womb. 
As a large and expanding economy, the role of China in APEC is obviously 
important in determining the goals and direction of the forum. When China 
joined APEC , some Chinese had feared that the developed economies, led by 
the US and Japan, might dominate APEC and the developing countries in it. 
However, they were soon reassured by the presence of other countries also 
concemed about the potential dominance of larger powers. APEC 
membership included the ASEAN collective, which like China, remained 
highly committed to the norm of upholding sovereignty in the conduct of 
international relations, and very cautious in making sure that APEC's 
institutional development would not constrain members to a course of action 
that they have no wish to pursue. By pointing out, as Chinese President Jiang 
Zemin did at the 1994 APEC Leaders' Summit in Bogor, Indonesia, that the 
diversity of the political systems, institutions and values precluded the pursuit 
ofuniformity as unrealistic (Wang 2003, 144), China and ASEAN managed to 
scuttle US President Clinton's prior proposal at Seattle for “securitizing" 
APEC, or institutionalizing it to any meaningful extent. However, in the 
run-up to hosting the Bogor summit, President Suharto of Indonesia was 
prevailed upon by the US and Australia, which appealed to his vanity as the 
elder statesman of ASEAN, to press the cause for trade liberalization within 
APEC, at least to set a timetable to that effect (Ravenhill 2001 , 106-108). 
Although Suharto seemed to have lost interest in this cause when his country 
was no longer the host of APEC, in any case, the dominant theme at Bogor 
would continue from Seattle to be the free trade push championed by the US 
and other Westem countries. 
One of China's main objectives in APEC is to strengthen its relationship with 
ASEAN, and engage ASEAN in joint efforts to promote the interests of 
developing countries in the forum (Moore and Yang 1999, 392). Within APEC, 
China has unfailingly supported ASEAN's 1990 “Kuching Consensus," based 
on the “ASEAN Way," which has evolved through decades of interaction 
among ASEAN member states and is characterized by decision-making based 
on consensus, gradualism, and voluntarism. China shares the belief with 
ASEAN and other developing countrjes within APEC that, because the 
economic starting point of members are different, their abilities to sustain 
market opening efforts are also different, and hence the principle of 
non-binding unilateral action after consultation should apply with respect to 
effecting trade liberalization measures. China and other developing countries 
in APEC were successful in making their case at Bogor for a deadline of2010 
for developed countries to carry out free trade and investment within the 
forum while developing countries will have up till 2020 to meet these goals. 
In hindsight, this albeit non-binding liberalization timetable which found its 
place in the 1994 Bogor Declaration would prove to be the high-water mark 
in the operationalization of APEC, as few tangible results have been achieved 
since then, with the advent of the “Asian / Chinese / Process-oriented" 
(shortened to “Asian") design for the forum, championed by China, South 
Korea, and most countries of ASEAN. 
Since its participation, China has used APEC as a vehicle to build support 
among member economies for its economic reforms and market opening, 
export pushes into foreign countries, and perhaps most importantly, accession 
to first the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and later, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). At the 1994 Bogor summit, knowing 
Chinese intentions, the US insisted that China join GATT / WTO as a 
developed country. Since China is recognized by APEC as a developing 
country, defined as a country with an annual per capital income of less than 
US$1000, and so does not have to liberalize trade until 2020 (Moore and 
Yang 1999, 396), China argued successfully that this would be its stance in its 
GATT/ 吼TTO talks with the US. China has clearly limited its commitments in 
APEC in order to avoid pressure for it to commit more in negotiations over 
WTO accession. 
Although Malaysia was the only country that explicitly rejected Bogor's 
liberalization timetable, ASEAN and China has achieved broad agreement by 
the time of that summit on what should be their preferred style or way of 
cooperation within APEC, which are to be based on the principles of 
voluntary and unilateral action, consensus,“open regionalism" through 
non-discriminatory trade and investment liberalization, equal attention to both 
liberalization and inter-state economic and technical cooperation, and 
retaining APEC as an official forum for discussion and not negotiation (Wang 
2003 , 143). By the end of 1994, in response to earlier EPG recommendations, 
ASEAN govemments have come to an agreement to negate any notion of 
binding investment principles or the adoption of dispute settlement 
mechanisms. To quote Feinberg,“member govemments purposefully 
eschewed creation of a powerful intemational bureaucracy that might develop 
a mind of its own... whose relative autonomy might give it the power and the 
will to drive policy." (Feinberg 2001 , 195) In rejecting “ Western" bargaining 
methods with specific goals, APEC fell back practically by default on the less 
structured and more informal “Asian" approach characterized by unilateral 
and voluntary measures that appear to reflect and withstand better the 
sensitive sovereignty concerns, powerful domestic political-economic 
interests, diverse political beliefs, different levels of economic development, 
and occasionally difficult foreign relations of countries, or economies, in the 
broad Asia - Pacific region. Considering that ASEAN govemments then 
successfully asked for the EPG's mandate to be terminated at the 1995 
Leaders' Meeting in Osaka, the decision at Osaka to establish the APEC 
Business Advisory Council (ABAC) for the di旺used business community to 
serve as the forum 's peak advisory body to hold industrial dialogues, although 
ABAC has a representative who attends Ministerial Meetings, cannot be 
considered progress made in the institutionalization of APEC. 
Since how liberalized trade should be has become a contentious issue within 
the forum , as most developing member economies did not seem to want free 
trade to be thrust upon them , Bogor did not determine any final standards for 
trade liberalization. That is, it never defined whether tariff should be 
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eliminated entirely or reduced to a low figure of, s呵， 3% or 5%. 
Consequently, when leaders to the APEC summit in 1995 in Osaka, Japan, 
met to finalize the Osaka Action Aσenda. where member economies 。，
undertook to “gradually reduce tariffs and non-tariff measures," no 
quantitative or joint targets were set. While the US , Australia and other major 
agricuhure exporting countries were in favor of trade liberalization in all areas, 
South Korea and Japan in particular argued for the exclusion of agriculture 
and other areas that they considered to be politically sensitive from such 
consideration (Wei 1996, 54), given the strength ofthe farmers' lobby in their 
electoral processes. 1n this aspect they were supported by China, which had 
wanted to minimize external impacts on its economy as much as possible. 
Malaysia and Thailand both have domestic automobile and automobile parts 
industries that they wished to protect. Osaka also failed to resolve the issue of 
“ non-discrimination," whereby any trade or investment privileges given by 
one APEC member economy to another will automatically be extended to 
non-APEC members, although at least one prominent study has shown that 
import, and presumably expo此， among APEC economies and from the rest of 
the world would definitely increase more with the elimination of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers throughout the world than with just their elimination within 
APEC (Chan and Nugent 1999, 527). This failure was primarily due to the 
fact that the US was afraid that, if the principle of “non-discrimination" were 
adopted, then Most Favored Nation (MFN) status will have to be 
automatically and unconditionally extended to a major economy like China 
that was as yet not a member of GATT / WTO; thus after heated debate, the 
Osaka Action Agenda managed only to urge APEC member economies to 
exert effort to realize the “non-discrimination" principle (Wei 1996, 54). 
Although tariff barriers were by then very low for the US as compared to 
other APEC economies, there were still quite a few items from its non-tariff 
menu that it could have chosen from to reduce import barriers but did not (Lu 
and Zhang 1996, 8), therefore undermining what the US has always exhorted 
other APEC members to do. 
The major benefit for China and developing countries in Asia is such 
“tlexibility" 的 arrived at through the artful waftling and compromises by 
APEC members at the Osaka meeting. Considering the great diversity in the 
stages of economic development and socio-political systems among member 
economies, a “ tlexible" approach in settling down to a consensual and 
non-binding style of policy cooperation is perhaps necessary to overcome 
mutual distrust and initiate and implement actions. Also, since China is a large 
developing country with low per capita income, on the difficult road from 
reforming a planned economic system into a market-oriented one, it wanted 
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APEC to move gradually, and consensually, which means giving every 
member an effective veto over any proposal that, in its opinion, may have an 
adverse effect on it if implemented. For the developing countries, the free 
trade objective, if pursued too fast and too furiously, risks exposing many of 
their manufacturing and service industries to competitive pressures which 
they could not withstand (Camilleri 2003 , 143). Japan was determined to keep 
tariffs on imported rice, wheat and other cereals at the range of 300% to 5000/0 
(Zhao 1997, 95), to protect its politically-intluential agricultural sector, and 
began to realize that moving closer to the Asian position on the non-binding, 
voluntary, consensual and non-discriminatory nature of APEC's functioning 
may garner it the support of Asian countries in detlecting US pressure on 
trade liberalization (Wang 2003 , 145). In a move seen as demonstrating quiet 
opposition to Washington's free trade banner, Tokyo announced a 10 billion 
Yen fund to promote economic and technical cooperation among APEC 
members (Lu 1997丸 109) ， after China held the inaugural meeting of APEC 
science and technology ministers in October 1995 and chose environmental 
protection, computer web-site development and emergency prevention as the 
key areas of cooperation (Tang 2003 , 329). Perhaps disappointed with the 
“ tlexibility" already demonstrated by APEC member economies at Bogor, US 
President Clinton skipped Osaka altogether. Since then, APEC as a dominant 
trans-Pacific economic construct has cleariy lost the interest and attention of 
its chief advocate, the United States. 
Since 1995, the 10的r goals of trade and investment liberalization have in 
reality been replaced by that of business facilitation in focusing on reducing 
the costs of business transactions and promoting the exchange of trade 
information. When at the 2001 APEC summit in China's Shanghai, the US 
tried to revise the Osaka Action Agenda, by introducing proposals such as the 
liberalization of tariffs until they reached zero, reduction of all non-tari叮
measures to the maximum possible extent, and elimination of all such 
measures counter to WTO stipulations, it did not manage to have any of these 
suggestions included in the final declaration (Lu 2002 , 50), which re f1ected 
the degree of disagreement among APEC participants. lt might have been 
theoretically possible for Western or developed economies to convince Asian 
or developing economies to liberalize trade and investment with all deliberate 
speed by offering to compensate them at the industry or sector level for any 
measurable losses. However, assuming that the types and levels of 
reimbursement can be agreed upon by all parties concerned, because of the 
high cost that will certainly be involved, no cross-national compensation 
schemes have ever been suggested. 
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IV.One “Asi3n / Chinese / Process-oriented" Design (1996-2000) 
ASEAN and Chinese officials have always insisted that economic and 
technical cooperation should receive at least equal priority with trade and 
investment liberalization on APEC's agenda (Moore and Yang 1999, 388). As 
of the 1993 Seattle summit, issues of economic and technical cooperation 
have never been separately raised at APEC meetings. However, on this, the 
flavor of the forum seemed to have changed following the 1995 Osaka 
summit. While ministerial meetings were held hitherto only on the portfolios 
of trade, finance, small and medium enterprises, education, and sustainable 
development of the environment, since 1995, they were subsequently 
introduced in the sectors of energy, health, human resource, mining, oceanic 
research, science and technology cooperation, telecommunications and 
information, transportation, women 's affairs and tourism. During the leaders' 
meeting at Manila in 1996, both the Chinese President and F oreign Minister 
came out strongly in favor of strengthening economic and technical 
cooperation within APEC. At the close of the meeting, under the aegis of host 
Philippines, an ‘APEC Framework Declaration on the Principles of Economic 
and Technical Cooperation' was adopted, which reflected the importance 
attached to economic and technical cooperation by developing members of 
APEC, more so than to trade and financial liberalization, which was the 
preference of the forum 's more industrialized members. 
The Manila Action Plan, arrived at through the 1996 APEC Manila ministerial 
meeting, outlined 6 areas for economic and technical cooperation: developing 
human capital, fostering sound and efficient capital markets, strengthening 
economic infrastructure, harnessing technologies of the future , promoting 
environmentally-sustainable growth, and encouraging the growth of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (Feinberg 2001 , 202). Thus “Ecotech" aims to 
develop human capital through technical training, build state or institutional 
capacity as a foundation for economic growth, and reduce economic 
disparities amongst APEC member economies. 1n 2006, of a total of 121 
Ecotech - related projects, 32% were focused on developing human capital, 
while 28% were focused on strengthening economic infrastructure 
(http://www.apec.org/content/apec/apec _groups/committees/som _ committee_ 
on_economic.html).2 The US feared that developing countries intended to 
transform APEC into a conduit for North-South transfers, so since Manila, it 
has been watchful for any signs that “Ecotech" may morph into demands for 
development assistance. Developing countries, on the other h,;md, see 
2 This and subsequent internet footnotes refer to the official website of the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation 
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“ Ecotech" as a foundation for promoting national economic development and 
poverty reduction, which would in tum serve as a basis for accepting trade 
and investment liberalization in the indefinite future. 
At the 1996 Manila ministerial meeting, the US had wanted the APEC 
membership to push for an information technology (IT) agreement at the 
WTO that would have abolished all tariffs for integrated circuits, 
semi-conductors, computer so丘ware and other IT products by 2000 (Lu 
1997b, 22). This suggestion made sense for the US , considering that is the 
biggest seller of IT products in the world, even then exporting almost US$1 00 
billion worth of such merchandise, dominating around 80% of the market in 
the Pacific Rim countries (Lu 1997b, 25). ln this, the US was supported by 
Japan, Canada, Australia and other developed countries, but China, Malaysia, 
lndonesia, Chile and other developing countries were against (Lu 1997b, 22). 
As a compromise retlective of the now dominant “Asian" approach in APEC, 
member economies rhetorically supported “major" reductions in tariffs for IT 
products by 2000, to be arrived “ tlexibly" at WTO negotiations in Geneva, 
Switzerland, (Lu 1997b, 25) by moving the issue out of APEC. 
As suggested at the Osaka summit and written into the Manila Action Plan, 
APEC's main vehicle for advancing toward the Bogor goal of “free and open 
trade and investment" is the lndividual Action Plans (IAPs) submitted by 
member economies on a rolling basis. The reporting of IAPs are based on 
activities to meet the go~ls of free and open trade and investment in such 
issues areas like tariffs, non-tariff measures, investment, services, customs 
procedures, standards, inteIlectual property, competition policy, government 
procurement, deregulation, rules of origin, and dispute mediation 
G句://www.apec.orglcontentJapec./about_apeclhow_apec _ operates/action ylans _.html). 
Under this plan, China promised to lower import tariffs by 2000 to 15% 
(Zhang and Lu 1997, 166), which was ultimately realized. ln addition, 
Collective Action Plans (CAPs) assist economic integration through the 
provision of databases, promotion of transparency, studies of best practices 
and policy initiatives, and business facilitation (Feinberg 2001 , 202). Neither 
commitments to the targets outlined in the IAPs nor CAPs are binding. Even 
though APEC has instituted peer review of member economies' IAPs by the 
officials, experts and ABAC of other APEC members (Zhong 2003 , 56), and 
established an electronic IAP (e-IAP) system at the 2000 Brunei summit to 
provide IAPs online for public inspection, yet under the principle of 
voluntarism, countries approach the Bogor targets at their own pace, which 
cannot guarantee faithful and effective enforcement. Furthermore, whatever 
little efforts that had already been made within APEC to advance within its 
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1994 Bogor summit goal of creating a free trade and investment zone by the 
2010 and 2020 deadlines were effectively derailed by the 1997 / 1998 East 
Asian tìnancial crisis (Dent 2003 , 78), which exposed APEC's inability to 
deal with the situation. 
In response to the previous summit in Osaka, in which the US Secretary of 
Defense William Perry attempted to engage participants in the discussion of 
security matters, the President of the Philippines and host of the 1996 Manila 
summit, Fidel Ramos, announced clearly at the beginning that the agenda of 
the summit would not include security issues (Wei 1996, 53). Ramos was 
clearly articulating the preferences of the Asian members of the forum. 
Despite widespread expectations, criteria for membership could not be agreed 
upon at the 1997 summit in Vancouver, Canada, so a ten year moratorium on 
new membership was then instituted, although Vietnam, Peru and Russia as 
Pacitìc Rim countries were allowed to join APEC the following year on an 
extemporized basis. Conceming APEC's concerted Early Voluntary Sectoral 
Liberalization (EVSL) scheme, even when it was introduced at the Vancouver 
summit, it was clear that Japan, which by then was tìrmly in the economic 
doldrums, would not liberalize any sector, particularly agriculture, forestry 
and tìsheries, to trade, which its govemment had deemed politically difficult 
to ca叮y out, despite intense pressure from the US (Damond 2003, 96; Dent 
2003 , 78). Since the failure ofEVSL negotiations in 1998, torpedoed by Japan, 
with support from other Asian countries, over the need to protect narrow 
domestic interests, US efforts to push for more rapid trade liberalization 
within APEC have been largely stymied. Since the 1998 summit in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia, when China joined Japan in arguing that product 
exemptions from tariff cuts in specitìc sectors were too stringent (Damond 
2003 , 99), and the 1999 summit in Auckland, New Zealand, whatever remains 
of liberalization efforts within APEC was left to individual member 
economies to put in place on a sectoral basis unilaterally (Zhou 2001 , 70). 
The principal task of APEC has by then moved on to the promotion of the 
WTO process, in whatever small ways it could. In any case, in all three 
summits in 1997, 1998 and 1999, APEC lost considerable credibility when it 
proved unable to come up with any concrete measures to assist Asian member 
economies ravaged by the tìnancial crisis then raging through the region. 
With the Asian tìnancial crisis in 1997-1999, US pressure on a叮ected
countries to adopt liberal economic reforms were dramatically increased, with 
loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to 
South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia made conditional on establishing new 
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regulatory, bankruptcy and accounting procedures, liberalization of capital 
markets, privatization of public enterprises and the breaking up of cartels 
(Wee 2002, 91). The IMF's recommended austerity measures such as raising 
interest rates and creating budget su中luses actually deepened recession, 
unemployment, and political instability, particularly in Indonesia, but also for 
Thailand (Lim 2004, 351). For -more than a year after seeking financial 
assistance from the I扎1F， the exchange rates on the Korean, Thai and 
Indonesian currencies actually deteriorated, in contrast to Malaysia, which 
had managed to reverse the fall in private capital inflow in 1998 by imposing 
capital controls without IMF help (Lim 2004, 344-6). The overall approach 
taken by the US through the IMF and World 8ank reflected their collective 
perspective that Japan's economic problems and the Asian crisis flow from 
the inefficiencies and distortions of the various state-centered approaches to 
capitalist development which prevail in East Asia (Berger 1998, 98). The 
Asian financial crisis did afford a chance for the deepening of economic 
liberalism in East Asia, particularly in the countries that suffered the most, but 
it also led to crisis of faith in intemational economic institutions led by the US, 
and the unpopularity of the American position within APEC with regional 
countries. 
To many in the Chinese officialdom, APEC remains one aspect of US strategy 
to enhance its national economic competitiveness through breaking down the 
trade and financial entry barriers of member economies to its penetration. As 
such, an APEC initiative such as the “Eminent Persons Group" headed by the 
American economist C. Fred Bergsten, a fervent free trade advocate, was 
viewed by the Chinese with particular suspicion, somewhat as a busybody 
attempting to pry into the affairs of individual member economies and tell 
them what to do. Hence when ASEAN suggested abolishing the EPG, this 
stance was supported by China to curb what it perceived to be US influence 
and free trade crusading in APEC. 
Up till the time of its joining the WTO, Beijing has sought to use APEC as a 
shield to resist external pressure for the rapid dismantling of trade barriers, 
even as Chinese leaders proclaimed their continuing adherence to the 2010 
and 2020 trade liberalization and facilitation goals (Morrison 2002, 129), and 
was altogether opposed to adding capital market liberalization to the APEC 
agenda, by arguing that financial liberalization was none of APEC's business 
(Moore and Yang 1999, 400-402). Still, to accommodate itselfto the rules and 
regulations of intemational commerce, realize its promises to APEC, and 
increase the speed of domestic economic reforms, the Chinese government 
has, among other measures, pushed to establish a modem industrial 
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management system, set up stock markets and security exchanges, cleanup its 
financial and banking institutions, reform its state-owned enterprises, 
strengthen its policing and enforcement mechanism to ensure the smooth 
functioning of laws and markets, attack local protectionist barriers and 
corruption to ensure fair competition in the marketplace, simplify customs 
and investment procedures, and harmonize its commercial laws and 
regulations in accordance with intemational standards (Wang 2003, 161). In 
support of “Ecotech," the Chinese government set up a US$10 million 
endowment fund specifically to promote scientific and technological 
production in developing APEC economies (Liang and Wang 2000, 58). 
The Americans have since been persuaded by other Asia - Pacific countries to 
be less confrontational toward China and more accommodating toward a 
much slower pace of realizing regional and global free trade than what the US 
would prefer, in line with the APEC style of conducting business along the 
“ASEAN Way". For Japan, putting the breaks on any concerted APEC push 
for trade liberalization has the advantage of aligning it more c10sely with 
Chinese and ASEAN interests and perceptions (Ravenhill 2001 , 99-103). 
Over the years, all players have agreed, reluctantly or otherwise, that APEC 
would essentially be a non-formal or minimally institutionalized forum for 
consu1tations and discussions among high-level representatives of member 
economies on matters of common interest and concem, particularly in the 
economic realm. Hence it is not surprising that leaders' meetings are 
customarily prefixed with the term “ informal," and all rules and principles 
adopted by APEC are labeled as “non-binding." (Zhang 2000, 32) 可Tith its 
emphasis on voluntary action, political commitment, open regionalism and 
broad economic cooperation, as opposed to negotiated agreement, legal 
obligation, specific reciprocity and sharply focused agenda, APEC has 
developed a distinct Asian f1avor much more akin to that of ASEAN than to 
regional institutions in Europe or the Americas (Morrison 2002, 131). 
V. One (“economic") and a Half (“securityηDesign (Since 2001) 
China and the ASEAN collectivity have always emphasized that regional 
cooperation, in both economic and security spheres, must take into account 
the principles of national sovereignty and non-intervention in the domestic 
affairs of states. Such a stance, taken with the heterogeneity of po1itical 
systems, sovereignty claims, border disputes, secessionist actions, security 
tensions and mutual suspicions among members in mind, has caused APEC 
meetings to exclude security and political issues from their agenda. Hbwever, 
since the APEC summit of 2001 , it was generally agreed that such issues 
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could be discussed, but only if they pertain directly to the economic security 
of member economies. 
Meeting in China's Shanghai just one month after the 9-11 attacks, APEC 
leaders at their 2001 summit promised to cooperate with the US to counter all 
forms of terrorism, acknowledging that terrorist activities will endanger the 
security and prosperity of the whole world. The harmful effects of terrorism 
on tourism were threatening a significant source of many member countries' 
economic development. In line with APEC's economic orientation, the 
resultant ‘APEC Leaders' Statement on Counter-Terrorism' directed members' 
finance and transportation ministries to, respectively, freeze the funds of 
terrorist organizations and improve air and maritime security. This Statement 
was the first political-cum-security declaration by APEC since its formation. 
Under an arrangement made by China as the host of the summit, no 
representatives from Taiwan (Chinese Taipei) or Hong Kong were allowed to 
attend the discussions pertaining to terrorism, since they were regarded by the 
Chinese as only non-sovereign economies and not states (Lu, 2004). 
Hosting the 2001 APEC Informal Leaders' Summit in Shanghai has been seen 
by the Chinese as an important measure in the heralding of China as a major 
responsible power in the international stage. While China's average tariff in 
1993 was still 37.5%, by 2001 this was reduced to 15.3%, and by 2002 the 
figure has reached 12% (Wang 2003，的0-151). Not to be upstaged by 
American concems about matters of anti-terrorism and security, the Chinese 
government made a commitment to APEC member economies to instruct 
1500 high-level specialists in computer website maintenance at its expense 
for the following three years and to contribute US$2 million to train personnel 
in the areas of finance (Zhao 2001 , 9). 
Following the terrorist bombing in Bali in October 2002, at the APEC leaders' 
meeting at Los Lobos, Mexico, the US led a drive to cooperate in notifying 
customs and immigration of suspicions travelers by member governments and 
increase security in monitoring shipping containers. Measures such as 
requiring biometric technology on exit and entry documents, standardized 
passenger and baggage screening and additional customs security to screen 
high risk ships and containers were all part of the US proposal (Aggarwal and 
Kwei 2006, 78). 
US a前empts to "re-securitize" APEC after its failures to do so by the 
mid-1990s were only a little more successful this time. At the 2003 APEC 
meeting in Bangkok, the US tried to put forward several security initiatives 
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regarding anti-nuc1ear proliferation in general and specific nuclear issues with 
North Korea and Iran into the APEC agenda, but this was opposed by many 
members as an unnecessary widening of the forum's ambit (Lu, 2004). 
Nonetheless, the US managed to persuade fellow APEC members to set up a 
Counter-Terrorism Task Force to study the issue of terrorist threats at that 
meeting. APEC's 2004 summit meetings in Santiago, Chile, and the 2005 
meeting in Busan, South Korea, have continued to provide occasions for 
world leaders to confer on major issues such as North Korea's nuc1ear 
intentions and emphasize the need to pursue counterterrorism measures. The 
2006 APEC meeting in Hanoi, Vietnam, further pledged to improve aviation 
security and encourage member economies to develop and share strategies 
and best practices to defend food supply from deliberate contamination. 
Although food security was again seriously discussed, it was environmental 
issues that for the first time took center stage at the 2007 APEC meeting in 
Sydney, Australia, when the host country, together with the US , brokered a 
draft for forum leaders to adopt that would reduce energy intensity 25 percent 
and increase forest cover in APEC member economies by at least 50 million 
acres by 2030; however, true to APEC practices, the draft also stipulated that 
both goals are non-binding. (http://www.cnn.com/2007IPOLITICS/09/08/ 
apec.ap/index.html?iref=newssearch) Although APEC was not set up as a 
confidence-building mechanism, the annual summitry does provide for the 
leaders of member economies both a “photo opportunity" and an effective 
channel to meet and exchange views on one another 's position on important 
affairs affecting the world. 
Although counter-terrorism and de-nuc1earization of North Korea have 
remained on the dec1arations after every APEC summit since 2002, and the 
US , China, and the other member economies have exto l1ed one another to 
work together to deal with issues of shared concern, there is no sign that the 
institutionalization of the forum has somehow progressed beyond allowing it 
to remain principally a discussion group, albeit a high-level one, for economic 
and related security interests. This is because there are few common and 
concrete purposes for members to work on. Particularly in terms of security 
concems, even though it is in the national interest of APEC members to guard 
against acts of terrorism in general, they do not have a universal enemy, 
terrorist or otherwise, that threatens them all in the same way or to the same 
degree. Furthermore, members are by and large suspicious that others may try 
to make use of the forum to push their own interests and agenda, and so tend 
to take a long time to study a proposal from all different possible angles. 
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For a multilateral forum the size of APEC, with many meetings, seminars, 
workshops, projects, reports and organs, it is not particular1y well-endowed 
financially, with an annual operating budget of less than US$4 million. This is 
in accord with the structural minimization approach for APEC favored by its 
developing country members. Since 1997, putting money where its mouth is 
largely not, Japan has provided more than US$4 million per year into a 
special account to promote trade and investment liberalization and facilitation 
(T1LF). 1n 2005 , members approved the establishment of the APEC Support 
Fund (ASF) to provide assistance to capacity programs for developing 
economies, with an initial donation of A$1 million from Australia, 
(http://www.apec.org/content/apec/apec_groups/committees/budget_and_man 
agement.html) a country that has hitherto fully backed the liberalization aims 
of the forum , but seemed to have come round to the “Asian" way of thinking. 
1n 2007, the US announced that it would contribute US$800,000 to the ASF, 
and US$1.5 million into the T1LF account, which makes plain where its 
priorities still are. (http://www.apec.org/content/apec/news _ medialmedial 
releases/030807月一uscontribapecproj.html) As for 俐的ts funded by AP眩，
although the SOM increased the value of projects which the BMC may 
approve under delegated authority from the SOM from US$20,000 to 
US$100,000, most of them are allocated less than US$300,000 (Feinberg and 
Lawrence 2006, 2-3). Yet even with financing a small survey, conference, or 
database construction, any APEC member economy can veto it through an 
action of indefinite delay by one of its representatives in the BMC, senior 
officials or ministers as it moves up the endorsement process (Feinberg 2003 , 
74, 77). 
To enable some APEC member economies that are willing and ready to move 
faster on specific areas or initiatives to do so, APEC uses an approach that it 
calls “Pathfinder 1nitiatives." (http://www.apec.org/contentlapec/apec_groups/ 
committees/economic_on_trade.html) Yet, for all of the forum's 
institutionalization efforts, since APEC commitments are not legal but rather 
political in adhering to the by now paramount “Asian+" design, there can be 
no sanctions to punish laggards or defectors. In any case, decisions made at 
the APEC summits and ministerial meetings, if there any, are non-binding, 
and left to individual members to execute. Peer pressure from fellow 
economies to get an APEC agenda adopted and executed works only to the 
extent that it is in the interest of a member to accept that pressure. The 
voluntary nature of the APEC decision-making process had succumbed 
completely to a least common denominator approach in reaching consensus, if 
any consensus can be reached at all, in which the goal of maintaining a 
tranquil atmosphere at APEC meetings is overriding (Damond 2003 , 102). As 
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members gain more trust in one another, they may be prepared to pool some 
sovereignty, if not with regards to security matters, at least in some less 
sensitive areas. Alas, that moment has clearly not yet arrived, and most APEC 
activities still remain at the stage of promoting dialogue, exchanging 
information, and publishing reports. 
VI. Who Needs APEC? 
In a clever presentation of the unavoidable as virtue, the official APEC 
web-site refers to APEC as being unique, in that it is the only mu1tilateral 
economic and trade forum in the world that is committed to reducing trade 
barriers and increasing investments without requiring its members to enter 
into legally binding obligations. (http://www.apec.org/contentlapec/ 
about_ apec/how _ apec _ operates.html) There has been no shortage of meetings 
or reports dealing with trade, investment, development or general economics 
issues of any and all types within the APEC system, except that they typically 
lead to extremely few concrete resu1ts that all parties could agree on to 
implement and evaluate together. By putting out serious proposals for free 
trade and investment in full expectation of its non-execution, APEC seems to 
have settled on an uneasy, and perhaps institutionalized, game of compromise 
between the preferences of the go-getting Westerners and the foot-dragging 
Asians. 
The crux of the contention in designing altemative visions for APEC f!1ay be 
seen as a reflection of opposing interests on liberalization and 
institutionalization within the forum between the US , its allies, developed or 
industrialized countries and newly-industrialized economies on the one hand, 
and China and developing or industrializing countries on the other hand, with 
Japan moving from the “ Westem" “camp" to the “Asian" one some time 
between 1994 and 1995. Fundamentally, while adherents of the “Western" 
design would like to promote and perpetuate the advantages that they enjoy or 
would do so with trade and investment liberalization, advocates of the 
“Asian" vision, despite suffering through the adverse impact that the Asian 
financial crisis had in varying degrees on their economies, still believe to 
some extent in preserving the business-political nexus and industrial policies 
that have brought a respectable measure of political stability, material 
prosperity and diplomatic influence to countries like Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan and Singapore. These two roadmaps reflect differences of interest and 
are not easily reconcilable. 
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The 1993 inaugural APEC Leaders' Summit at Seattle was significant to the 
extent that the profile of the forum was henceforth heightened. By 1995 , the 
institutional or organizational structure of APEC that exists today has been 
put in place, but it was also at the Osaka Summit that the last major joint 
effort to push for comprehensive trade and investment liberalization clearly 
failed, and where members decided that an autonomous structure for the 
forum was not in the offing by abolishing the EPG. By the end of 1997, 
technical and developmental issues have clearly dominated forum 
deliberations, and the APEC sub-caucus of EAEC had become formalized as 
a self-standing ASEAN+ 3, grouping leaders of ASEAN, Japan, China and 
South Korea together in annual conclaves that are independent of the forum. 
As Asian economies have fully recovered to strong economic growth from the 
devastating financial crisis of last century's end and the debilitating Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003 , the “Asian" design for APEC 
is likely to continue dominating the forum 's enterprise at the expense of the 
“Western" one. Although India had expressed its desire to join APEC, the 
forum decided at its 2007 summit that India's case will not be discussed 
before 2010. There were speculations that some westem economies in APEC 
had delayed India 's application because of worries that, as a large Asian 
economy, its joining would increase Asia's weight in APEC (Malaysian Sun, 
9 September 2007, A 1), and move the forum- even further away from the 
“ Westem" design. 
Given its important economic and security roles in the Asia - Pacific region, 
the US has preferred, and still prefers, to deal with regional polities on a 
bilateral basis. Having secured an FTA with Singapore by the end of 2002, the 
US voiced interest in exploring similar deals with Malaysia, the Philippines 
and Thailand (Dent 2003 , 80). In November 2002, President George W. Bush 
announced the ‘Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative' (EAI) that is designed to 
eventually create a regional network linking bilateral FTAs between 
individual ASEAN states and the US (Dent 2003 , 130). Along with the 
spirited pursuit of bilateral FTAs, emphasis on the completion of the 乳TTO's
Doha Round retlects Washington 's ambivalence about the continuing 
prospects of a regional economic forum that is seemingly ineffective, at least 
from the point of view of securing definite commitments from East Asian 
govemments to liberalize US imports into regional economies. Even on 
crucial matters such as the reduction of the more than US$200 billion trade 
deficit with China, accompanied by charges of dumping, high tariffs, 
inconsistent application of laws and regulations, and intellectual property 
rights violation, the US has not sought to use APEC to any extent as an arena 
to exert pressure on Beij ing, preferring instead to do so at bilateral meetings 
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with Chinese govemment officials. Indeed, the forum seemed to have merited 
so little attention from the US that, at the 2007 APEC summit in Sydney, 
President George 乳人 Bush referred in a public speech to APEC as “OPEC" 
and his Australian hosts as “Austrians" (The Times, 8 September 2007, A2). 
Although an APEC led by the US would not have been welcomed by every 
member economy, an absentee or absent-minded role on its part would put the 
continuing effectiveness of the forum into very serious doubts. 
During the WTO standstill after its tumultuous 1999 meeting in Seattle, and 
coming out of more than a decade of sluggish growth, industrial closures, lost 
jobs, contraction in bank lending and frequent loan recalls (MacIntyre and 
Naughton 2005 , 85-86), Japan concluded FTAs with Singapore and Mexico to 
spur its economy. Hedging against the success of the Doha Round and the 
efficacy of APEC, Singapore completed similar agreements with Australia, 
New Zealand, the US , and the European Free Trade Association countries 
(Aggarwal and Kwei 2006, 83). 
APEC has been a vast intemational stage for China, and for more than ten 
years since its joining, China has borrowed the use of this stage to improve 
and develop its diplomatic profile and economic relations with countries in 
the Asia - Pacific that are important to it. However, at the same time that the 
US is widely viewed as backing down from the multilateral approach and, 
together with Japan, is seen as engaging in more protectionist economic 
policies, China is increasingly stressing a more pro-active foreign policy and 
liberal economic agenda, in endorsing multilateral structures, supporting freer 
trade, involving itself in trans-national issues, and sponsoring security 
arrangements (Chow 2006, 261). 
APEC is now far from being the only regional forum in which China is a 
member. Since joining the WTO in December 2001 , China has carried out 
separate negotiations on bilateral FTA with a dozen countries including 
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Chile (Lu 2004, 10). China has no 
further need of APEC as a testing ground for domestic political acceptability 
of market openness or economic integration, nor has the US or the world any 
more use for APEC as the primary mechanism to “ socialize" China to 
capitalist or peaceful norms, as was arguably the case in the first half of the 
1990s. 
Nonetheless, taking part in the activities of APEC has the important 
consequence of raising the confidence and reducing the suspicion of the 
Chinese leadership and foreign policy community in interacting with foreign 
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officials and diplomats, to the extent that China has become keen to promote 
regional institutions where the US and its allies are excluded, such as the 
Shanghai Cooperative Organization, ASEAN + 3 and ASEAN + China, under 
the rubric of which ASEAN states and China signed the Framework 
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation in 2002 to begin 
negotiations to realize an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area between China and 
all ASEAN states by 2015. China's participation in APEC can be expected to 
continue at some perfunctory level , but the flow of real diplomatic energy 
would swing toward the realm of bilateral relations and multilateral 
organizations where China feels not only more comfortable, but also more 
economically powerful. 
The “concerted unilateral liberalization" touted in APEC's IAP scheme have 
been displaced by “concerted bilateral liberalization," in the sense that trade 
bilateralism seems to have now totally marginalized APEC's endeavors at 
advancing trade liberalization in the Asia - Pacific (Dent 2003 , 79). Bilateral 
trade agreements have emerged as the preferred mechanism for APEC 
member economies to realize reciprocal market access, consequently making 
APEC itself virtually redundant as a forum to advance overall freer trade. 
APEC's fifteen-year “Mid-term Stock-take" at the 2005 Busan summit, which 
was supposed to generate a second wind for APEC, came and went with nary 
a squeak. Yet, despite its many limitations and unfulfilled promises as a 
multilateral decision-making process for trade and investment policy issues, 
APEC has brought together the leaders of most economies of any size on both 
sides of the Pacific Ocean to discuss trade, investment, and of late, economic 
security and even environmental concems, provided the US with a platform to 
demonstrate to the world a greater degree of economic multilateralism than 
before, and more so, proven to be a useful vehicle in “socializing" China into 
becoming a more accepted and commitled member of the international system. 
We may be asking too much of it in asking for more. 
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